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Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining
* 
 
In his classic article “An Essay on Bargaining” Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might 
actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling’s conjecture in a 
simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two 
possible offers. Option A always gives the proposer a higher payoff than option B. The payoff 
of the responder depends on the (randomly determined) state of nature, i.e., in state s2 
payoffs of the two players are aligned while they are not in state s1. The responder is always 
informed about the actual state. The proposer knows the actual state in our first treatment but 
not in the second. We find that proposers indeed benefit from ignorance because the 
responders accept almost all offers (even the unfavorable ones) if the payoffs of the 
responder have not been transparent for the proposer. In additional treatments we 
investigate situations where the proposer can deliberately remain ignorant. One could 
assume that remaining ignorant on purpose would be punished by the responder at least if 
an unfavorable outcome results. Surprisingly, we find that strategically remaining ignorant 
tends to be beneficial for the proposer particularly if the responder does not know with 
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1.  Introduction 
Information about an opponent’s bargaining position plays an important role in 
negotiations and it not only affects the own bargaining behavior but also the behavior of 
an  opponent.  Generally  it  is  assumed  that  the  more  information  is  at  hand  about  a 
bargaining situation, the better the bargaining position. But Schelling (1960) challenged 
this view by arguing that a bargainer incompletely informed about his opponent’s payoff 
structure might have an advantage because the completely informed opponent would be 
forced  to  make  concessions  to  avoid  a  bargaining  breakdown.  In  his  chapter  on 
“Strategic Moves” Schelling notes that “(…) ignorance can be an advantage to a player 
if it is recognized and taken into account by an opponent” (Schelling, 1960, p.161). Since 
the informed bargainer knows that the uninformed one is not aware of what a reasonable 
solution would be, the responsibility of avoiding a stalemate is a burden on the informed 
bargainer. Early experimental studies seem to support this view (Siegel & Fouracker, 
1960,  Hamner  &  Harnett,  1975).  The  following  simple  example  illustrates  the  basic 
intuition: Two persons walking on a crowded main street are going to clash into each 
other. One of the persons anticipates this upcoming event but the other one is unaware, 
for example, due to a distraction. The person aware of the possible clash clears the way 
accepting the ―cost‖ of leaving his ideal route. The (unintentionally) ignorant person just 
perfectly  walks  his  way.  Being  uninformed  pays  off.  Ignorance  might  even  be  used 
strategically. A person who anticipates that a clash could happen might just walk through 
the street looking at the ground pretending to be ignorant. The other informed person has 
to  bear  the  costs  of  avoiding  the  clash,  although  he  might  have  the  feeling  that  the 
ignorant person intentionally avoided to look up. Thus, remaining strategically ignorant 
might pay off. Putting this to an organizational context, one might think of a business 
partnership. At one day an urgent request comes in but only one of the two partners is in 
the office. Subtasks have to be allocated quickly between the two partners and the nature 
of the tasks prohibits re-allocation afterwards. By deliberately remaining ignorant and not 2 
 
asking the partner about his preferences, the partner in the office can pick her preferred 
subtasks and leave the other subtasks to her partner. Should it turn out that the partner 
dislikes the subtasks allocated to him, she can come up with the excuse: ―Oh sorry, I 
didn’t know‖. The excuse might still have some force despite the fact that in principle she 
could have informed herself – or at least tried to do so - for example, by calling her 
partner by phone.
1    
  The aim of this study is to experimentally test Schelling’s conjecture in a simple 
two-person take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game. As it is particularly difficult to observe 
(strategic) ignorance in bargaining in the field, we chose an experimental approach that 
allows  for perfect  monitoring  of actions  including  those by which  one  tries to avoid 
acquiring information. The most important advantage of an experimental study is control 
(see Roth 1995, Falk & Fehr, 2003) which is essential for our purpose, i.e., drawing 
conclusions  about  how  strategic  ignorance  causally  affects  behavior.  Moreover,  in 
comparison to questionnaire studies it is possible to provide participants with incentives 
which are likely to be crucial for the influence of strategic ignorance in bargaining. Our 
basic experimental framework comprises a simple situation that is reduced to the very 
essentials of strategic ignorance. One out of two states of nature is determined by a 50:50 
draw. While in state s1 interests of a proposer and a responder are in conflict, they are 
aligned in state s2. The proposer has to offer one out of two options, option A or option B. 
In state s1, the proposer profits from option A more than the responder. Option B in state 
s1 would almost equalize both players’ payoffs, but this option is slightly inferior for the 
proposer in comparison to option A. In state s2 with aligned interests, option A provides 
both  players  with  higher  payoffs  than  option  B.  The  responder  can  accept  the  offer 
proposed or he can reject it. Accepting an offer always leads to positive payoffs for both 
players while rejection leaves them with payoffs of zero. 
In the treatment Transparency both players are fully informed about the true state. 
We observe that proposers are not able to always implement their most preferred option. 
                                                 
1 Fischbacher and Utikal (2010) analyze the effectiveness of apologies in preventing punishments after 
harmful offenses. They find that excuses are not accepted if the harmdoer commits offenses intentionally. If 
the intention of an offense is not clear, i.e., if the situation is ambiguous, apologies seem to be an effective 
instrument  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  being  punished.  In  our  context,  remaining  ignorant  blurs  the 
intentionality  of  the  proposer  and  thereby  might  reduce  the  likelihood  of  being  punished  through  a 
rejection.  3 
 
Unfavorable  offers  are  rejected  frequently.  In  the  Non-Transparency  treatment  the 
proposer  is  ignorant  about  the  true  state  but  the  responder  knows.  This  is  shared 
knowledge among the players. We hypothesize that the proposer will benefit from being 
ignorant as the responder will accept almost all offers even unfavorable ones. As the 
experimental results show, the ignorant proposer can indeed almost always implement 
her  most  preferred  option,  i.e.,  option  A.  One  way  to  explain  these  results  might  be 
differences in causal attributions on outcomes. If an offer is attributable to a chance-based 
source (i.e., the random incidence of one of the two states of nature) responders accept 
even unfavorable offers because negative intentions were not involved (e.g. see Blount, 
1995, and Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2008). 
In a third treatment, Choice, the proposer can choose between remaining ignorant 
about the occurring state or to reveal the state. Both alternatives incur no direct monetary 
costs.  The  idea  to  introduce  a  possibility  to  remain  strategically  ignorant  about  the 
opponent’s payoff is adapted from Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007), who analyze the 
strategic use of ignorance in a dictator game setup. In their game the dictator can remain 
ignorant to justify a selfish action in front of herself. In our setting not to reveal the state 
also  allows  the  proposer  to  go  for  the  self-interested  offer  (i.e.,  option  A)  without 
knowing whether this proposal is unfavorable to the responder. Knowing the state would 
potentially put some (internal) pressure on the proposer to decide for the more equalizing 
option B in state s1. Additionally, by remaining ignorant the proposer might want to 
influence the responder’s inclination to accept an unfavorable offer. The responder is 
always informed about the actual state and he also learns whether the proposer chose to 
remain ignorant or not. We hypothesize that proposers will not benefit from strategic 
ignorance  as  responders  will  perceive  the  act  of  remaining  ignorant  as  hostile. 
Surprisingly, our results show that responders tend to reject unfavorable proposals less 
often when the proposers remain ignorant. To push the idea of the perception of hostile 
intentions a bit further we designed a modified version of the Choice treatment, Choice 
Uncertain Revelation, where the intention to reveal is only successful in 50% of the 
cases. As a consequence if the proposer remains ignorant, the responder does not know 
whether this ignorance emerged on purpose or not. We find that responders significantly 
more often accept unfavorable offers from ignorant proposers than from proposers who 4 
 
successfully revealed the state. In a fifth treatment, Choice Hidden, the responder is not 
informed  whether  the  proposer  revealed  the  state  or  not.  Here  few  proposers  remain 
ignorant and responders quite often accept unfavorable offers.     
  The paper is organized as follows. We start by discussing the literature related to 
strategic  ignorance.  Secondly,  we  elaborate  our  experimental  design  and  derive  our 
hypotheses.  In  section  five  we  report  the  experimental  results.  Finally,  section  six 
discusses the results in the light of previous findings and concludes.          
        
2. Related Literature  
Proctor and Schiebinger (2008, p.3) emphasize the omnipresence of ignorance 
from an epistemic perspective and differentiate between ―ignorance as native state (or 
resource), ignorance as lost realm (or selective choice), and ignorance as a deliberately 
engineered and strategic play (or active construct)‖. Despite the relevance of strategic 
ignorance in human interactions, the literature on this topic in bargaining is relatively 
small. Some experimental studies have indicated that negotiators might not profit from 
being  uninformed.  For  example,  Roth  and  Murnighan  (1982)  showed  that  varying 
information asymmetries between negotiators has an impact on how a pie is split up, i.e., 
uninformed negotiators tend to be exploited by their informed opponents. Negotiators 
made lower offers if they knew that their opponent was unaware about the actual pie size. 
Being ignorant turned out to be a disadvantage (see also Kagel, Kim and Moser, 1996).  
Other experimental investigations, however, have shown that ignorance might be 
an advantage. A seminal study of the role of ignorance in bargaining was conducted by 
Siegel and Fouraker (1960). In their bilateral bargaining experiment the buyer knew the 
payoff tables of both sides but the seller only knew his own payoff table. Buyer and seller 
then had to come up with a price-quantity agreement. Although their results were not 
significant,  the  authors  identified  a  clear  tendency  that  the  incompletely  informed 
participant was better off than his informed opponent. Siegel and Fouraker argued that 
the incompletely informed bargainer established a higher aspiration level as he was not 
able  to  form  realistic  expectations  and  therefore  made  larger  demands,  smaller 
concessions and accepted longer durations to reach an agreement. A follow up study by 
Hamner and Harnett (1975) showed a similar effect. Beisecker, Walker and Bart (1989) 5 
 
also examined a complete-incomplete information situation with a fictitious bargaining 
task. Their results show that an uninformed bargainer can profit from ignorance when his 
counterpart perceives the own advantage as a violation of procedural equity. To restore 
relational  equity,  the  completely  informed  bargainer  may  accept  less  favorable 
agreements. In sum, this strand of literature suggests that it can indeed be an advantage to 
be ignorant in bargaining. None of these studies, however, examine the possibility to 
strategically choose to remain ignorant. 
More  recently,  Poulsen  and  Roos  (2010)  examined  the  effect  of  strategic 
information avoidance in a Nash demand game where two players had to negotiate about 
the distribution of an amount of money. At the beginning, the responder had to decide 
whether or not he wanted to learn about a demand a proposer claimed. The proposer was 
informed  about  the  responder’s  decision,  before  stating  his  demand.  In  the  repeated 
setting responders learned that more information may hurt, i.e., over time, information-
avoidance increased and the distribution of the surplus became more balanced. In an 
ultimatum game setup, Poulsen and Tan (2007) let the responder choose his Minimum 
Acceptable Offer (MAO). The proposer could then costlessly acquire the information 
about  the  responder’s  MAO  before  making  his  proposal.  The  offer  was  accepted  or 
rejected  according  to  the  previously  stated  MAO.  It  turned  out  that  one  third  of  the 
proposers  remained  uninformed  and  offered  half  of  the  pie.  Information-acquiring 
proposers set offers equal to the responders’ MAOs. In a treatment without information-
acquisition,  the  MAOs  stated  by  the  responders  were  smaller  compared  to  the 
information-acquisition treatments showing that the opportunity of gathering information 
about the MAOs may backfire for the informed party. Thus in these two studies one 
player had the chance to remain ignorant about the other player’s strategic choice. In our 
study proposers are able to remain ignorant about the consequences the own offer has on 
the payoff of the other player. In a similar vain Gehrig, Güth and Levinský (2003, 2006) 
examined a situation in which a proposer could purchase information about a responder’s 
outside option in an ultimatum game. Under transparent information acquisition, where 
the responder knew whether the proposer was informed, acceptance rates were higher 
than in non-transparent situations.  6 
 
As already mentioned above, our experimental design is also influenced by the 
dictator game setup of Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007). The aim of their study was to 
analyze whether generosity in dictator game-giving is truly evidence of the concern for 
desirable social outcomes. They showed that when the dictator had the opportunity not to 
know whether his action hurt the receiver or not, many dictators chose a ―moral wiggle 
room‖ and made self-interested choices. Dana et al. concluded that dictators were more 
concerned with seeming fair to themselves than to really being fair (see also Dana, Cain 
and Dawes, 2006, and Broberg, Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007). 
   
3.  Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.1 A Simple Model of Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining 
We consider a situation in which a random move selects one of two possible states 
of nature, s1 and s2, which occur with equal probability. This is known to all players. A 
proposer (P) makes a take-it-or-leave-it-offer to a responder (R) by choosing between two 
possible options, option A and option B. The responder has to decide about accepting or 
rejecting the offer. Rejection leaves both players with zero payoffs. Accepted options 
provide both players with strictly positive payoffs. An accepted option A pays more to the 
proposer than an accepted option B. Whether an accepted option A is more preferable 
from the responder’s perspective than an accepted option B depends on the actual state of 
nature. In state s1 the responder’s payoff from option B is higher than from option A. In 
state s2 it is the other way round. Thus, in state s2 the payoffs of the two players are 
aligned, i.e., option A is the preferred option of both players, while in state s1 they are not 
aligned. In the following we call an offer of option A in state s1 an unfavorable offer for 
the responder and option B in state s1 a favorable one. Figure 1 shows the game tree with 
the exact payoff details.
2 Our five treatments build on this baseline game. In all of our 
treatments the responder knows the actual state of nature when he decides on accepting or 
rejecting the proposed offer. Treatments differ in what the proposer knows or can learn 
                                                 
2  We basically use the same payoff parameters as Dana et al. (2007) in their dictator game but reduce the 
option B payoff of the proposer. This makes option A in state s1 – in which the payoffs of the two players 
are not aligned – slightly more attractive for the proposer, i.e., in the Choice treatments (see below) the 
proposer  might  be  more  inclined  to  remain  ignorant.  For  completeness  the  game  trees  for  the  other 
treatments are provided in the appendix.  7 
 
about the actual state of nature before making the offer. We also vary what the responder 
knows  about  what  the  proposer  knew  when  making  the  offer.  In  the  following  we 
introduce the details of our five treatments. 
               
Figure 1: Tree of the game employed in the Transparency treatment (without the dotted-line information 
set of P) and in the Non-Transparency treatment (including the dotted-line information set of P). The 




In our first treatment, Transparency, we employ the game depicted in Figure 1 
without the dotted-line information set of the proposer, i.e., the proposer knows the actual 
state  of  nature  when  she  makes  the  offer.  Our  second  treatment,  Non-Transparency, 
includes the dotted-line information set, i.e., the proposer is not aware of the true state of 
nature  when  making  her  offer.  In  the  third  treatment,  Choice,  we  endogenize 
transparency, i.e., the proposer can choose between a transparent situation and a non-
transparent one. The proposer can reveal the actual state of nature or she can remain 
ignorant both at no costs. Then she decides on the offer. Before the responder accepts or 
rejects the offer he learns whether the proposer revealed the actual state of nature or not, 
i.e.,  the  responder  becomes  aware  of  whether  an  unfavorable  offer  has  been  made 
knowingly  or  whether  it  has  been  made  in  the  dark.  Building  on  the  game  used  in 
treatment Choice, in two other treatments we relax the assumption that the responder is 
informed about what the proposer knew when making the offer. In the fourth treatment, 
Choice  Uncertain  Revelation  (henceforth  Choice-UR),  it  is  uncertain  whether  the 
proposer will be successful with her attempt to reveal the true state of nature. If she 
chooses  to  remain  ignorant  she  remains  ignorant  for  sure.  If  she  chooses  to  reveal, 8 
 
revelation is not certain but there is a 50% chance that revelation is successful, i.e., she 
learns about the true state of nature with a 50:50 chance. Otherwise she remains ignorant. 
The responder is informed whether or not the proposer knew the actual state of nature 
when she made the offer. If the proposer was informed it is clear for the responder that 
the proposer chose to reveal and that her attempt was successful. If the responder learns 
that the proposer was not informed, it might be due to two different reasons. First, the 
proposer did not want to know. Or, second, she actually wanted to know but was not 
successful in revealing the information. Thus, in the latter case the responder cannot be 
sure about the actual intentions of the proposer, i.e., whether she tried to reveal or not. In 
our  fifth  treatment,  Choice  Hidden  (henceforth  Choice-H),  the  responder  is  kept 
uninformed about whether the proposer revealed the actual state of nature or not.  
 
3.3 Procedures 
The experimental sessions took place at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic 
Research (CLER) from August 2010 to April 2011. Subjects were recruited by the online 
recruitment system programmed by Greiner (2004). Overall we had 592 participants (289 
female)  who  were  randomly  drawn  from  a  subject  pool  of  over  3.000.  Each  session 
involved 16 to 32 participants and they were not allowed to take part in more than one 
session.  About  half  of  the  participants  were  majoring  in  economics  or  business 
administration, the other half was enrolled in different fields like law and sciences. On 
average, participants were in their fourth year of studies. We conducted two sessions of 
the Transparency, the Non-Transparency and the Choice-H treatment, respectively. Since 
potential variations of plays are larger in the other two treatments we ran six sessions of 
the Choice and eight sessions of the Choice-UR treatments.  
At the beginning of a session, participants were randomly allocated to cubicles. 
After they had been seated, written instructions were distributed. Within a session, all 
subjects received the same instructions. Instructions of different treatments were kept 
exactly the same with the exception of well-defined passages that described the treatment 
variations (see appendix). Each participant learned that he would play a simple one-shot 
game  by  interacting  with  one  other  person  in  the  room  who  was  randomly  and 9 
 
anonymously matched to him. Before a session started, subjects had to answer a pen and 
paper quiz to confirm that they had understood the game (see appendix for the quiz).  
The  experiment  was  computerized  using  Fischbacher’s  zTree  software  (2007). 
Participants were informed about their randomly assigned roles on the first screen. We 
neutrally labeled a proposer as ―participant X‖ and a responder as ―participant Y‖. The 
two  states  of  nature  were  denoted  by  ―Case  1‖  and  ―Case  2‖,  respectively.  In  the 
treatments Transparency and Non-Transparency a proposer just had to choose between 
option A or option B. In addition in the other three treatments a proposer had to decide on 
whether to reveal the true state of nature or not. As mentioned above a responder always 
learned about the true state of nature before deciding on accepting or rejecting the offer. 
To  collect  more  data  on  the  responders’  behavior  we  requested  their  decisions  by  a 
reduced version of the strategy method (Selten, 1967)
3, i.e., the responder was not asked 
for a complete strategy but had to decide whether – given the actual state of nature – he 
would be willing to accept or reject option A and option B.  
To gain deeper insights into subjects’ preferences and motivations, we asked them 
about their beliefs regarding the behavior of the other player and about their decisions on 
hypothetical  situations  after  subjects  had  completed  their  decisions  (and  before  they 
learned about those of the other player). The hypothetical situations dealt with a different 
treatment  or  a  different  state  of  nature.  In  the  Transparency  and  Non-Transparency 
treatments, we asked the proposer and the responder to imagine that they had to decide in 
the  same  role  but  in  the  situation  of  the  other  treatment,  respectively.  In  the  Choice 
treatments,  we  asked  subjects  to  imagine  that  the  opposite  decision  regarding  the 
revelation of the true state of nature had been taken. For example, we asked a proposer, 
who actually decided to remain ignorant, which option, A or B, she would have offered, 
had she revealed the actual state. 
At the end of each session subjects were informed about the decisions of the other 
player they were matched with and about their payoffs. Afterwards they were requested 
to  fill  in  a  questionnaire  asking  subjects  to  briefly  explain  the  motivation  of  their 
decisions. Finally participants were privately paid their payoffs from the game in addition 
                                                 
3 There is no clear evidence on whether employing the strategy method or not leads to differences in 
behavior. On this ―hot-or-cold‖ debate see for example Brandts und Charness (2011). 10 
 
to an individual show-up fee of €2.50. On average participants earned €7.04 and sessions 
lasted for approximately 35 minutes. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
Assuming  that  it  is  common  knowledge  that  the  two  bargainers  are  purely 
interested in maximizing their own payoffs, the responder should accept both offers in 
both states of nature, irrespective of whether the proposer revealed the true state of nature 
or not. Thus, the proposer could safely offer option A since this option yields him a 
higher payoff in both states of nature. However, we know from many experiments on the 
ultimatum game and other games that proposers offer more than just the smallest positive 
amount (see, for example, Güth, Schmittberger, Schwarze, 1982 and Camerer, 2003). 
This seems to be partly driven by the proposer’s concerns for (distributive) fairness.
4 
Partly, it is because responders are willing to reject unfair offers and/or offers that signal 
bad intentions of the proposer (see Blount, 1995 and Falk, Fehr, Fischbacher 2008).  
In the following we mainly concentrate on behavior in state s1, which is the more 
interesting state of nature as in this state payoffs of the two players are not aligned, i.e., 
option A yields higher payoffs for the proposer but is less equitable and provides the 
responder with smaller payoffs than option B. In state s2 payoffs are aligned and it can 
safely be assumed that option A will be proposed and accepted. Our hypotheses and their 
rationales are summarized in Table 1. 
                                                 
4  Models  of  social  preferences  can  partly  explain  such  behaviour.  For  prominent  models  of  inequity-
aversion, see Levine (1998), Fehr und Schmidt (1999) and Bolton und Ockenfels (2000). The influence of 
intentions is modelled in (Falk und Fischbacher, 2008). Concerns for efficiency might also play a role in 
our setting (Charness und Rabin, 2002). See also the finding on mini-ultimatum games that employ a 
reduced strategy set – often two strategies – for the proposer (see, for example, Bolton and Zwick, 1995, 




Table 1: Hypotheses on the proposers’ and responders’ behavior in the five treatments with a focus on state s1
        
Treatment  Hypotheses on Proposers’ Behavior   Hypotheses on Responders’ Behavior   
Transparency 
  A  considerable  number  of  proposers  offer  option  B                                                   
in state s1. 
Rationale: Proposers might be concerned about distributive fairness and/or 
fear responders’ rejection of option A. 
  In state s1 a substantial proportion of responders reject option A while 
option B is virtually always accepted.  
Rationale: Some responders might prefer zero payoffs for both players to accepting the 
unfavorable option A in state s1.  
Non-Transparency  
  Proposers almost always offer option A.  
Rationale: Proposers earn more with option A and they have no reason to 
believe that option B is better for the responder.  
  Irrespective of the true state of nature responders tend to accept all offers.  
Rationale: Responders are aware of the fact that proposers do not know the actual state of 
nature. Thus, even an unfavorable offer of option A in state s1 is not seen as badly intended. 
Choice 
 
  Virtually all proposers reveal the state of nature.  
Rationale: When remaining ignorant proposers risk to offer an unfavorable 
option A (if the actual state is s1). 
  Proposers who reveal the state of nature to be s1 offer the                                                  
favorable option to the responder, i.e., option B. 
 Rationale: Proposers might be concerned about distributive fairness and/or 
fear responders’ rejection of option A. 
 
  Unfavorable  offers  proposed  by  ignorant  proposers  are  not  more                         
often accepted than unfavorable offers from informed proposers.  
Rationale: Proposing an unfavorable offer after deliberately having remained ignorant is 
considered as equally badly by the responder as knowingly doing so. 
Choice Uncertain Revelation 
  Virtually all proposers try to reveal the true state of nature.  
Rationale: When remaining ignorant proposers risk to offer an unfavorable 
option A (if the actual state is s1). 
  Proposers who successfully reveal the state to be s1 offer the 
favorable option most of the time, i.e., option B.    
Rationale: Proposers might be concerned about distributive fairness and/or 
fear responders’ rejection of option A. 
 
  In  comparison  to  Choice  a  larger  proportion  of  responders  accept  an                                  
unfavorable offer in state s1 from ignorant proposers.  
Rationale: An ignorant proposer might have tried to reveal the state. Thus, being ignorant 
and making an unfavorable offer in state s1 might not be badly intended.  
 
 
Choice Hidden  
  Virtually all proposers reveal the state of nature.  
Rationale: When remaining ignorant proposers risk to offer an unfavorable 
option A (if the actual state is s1). 
  Proposers who reveal the state of nature to be s1 offer the                                                  
favorable option to the responder, i.e., option B. 
 Rationale: Proposers might be concerned about distributive fairness and/or 
fear responders’ rejection of option A. 
 
  Unfavorable offers are accepted similarly often as in Choice.  
Rationale: Proposing an unfavorable offer after deliberately having remained ignorant is 
considered as equally badly by the responder as knowingly doing so. 12 
 
5.  Results 
In  a  first  step  we  will  discuss  the  results  from  the  Transparency  and  Non-
Transparency treatments. Then we present our findings from the three Choice treatments 
in which subjects can deliberately remain ignorant.  
 
5.1. Results Transparency and Non-Transparency  
Table 2 summarizes the results from the Transparency and Non-Transparency 
treatment. In Transparency 9 out of 16 proposers (56%) offered option A in state s1. In  
                 
      State s1  State s2 
      Option A  Option B  Option A  Option B 
Transparency                
(n=64) 
Proposals  9/16 (56%)  7/16 (44%)  16/16 (100%)  0/16 (0%) 
Acceptance Rates  11/16 (69%)  16/16 (100%) 16/16 (100%) 10/16 (63%) 
Non-
Transparency                
(n=64) 
Proposals  15/16 (94%)  1/16 (6%)  15/16 (94%)  1/16 (6%) 
Acceptance Rates  15/16 (94%)  16/16 (100%) 16/16 (100%) 14/16 (88%) 
 
Table 2: Results from Transparency and Non-Transparency; note that in the treatment Non-Transparency 
the 32 proposers are not aware of the actual state 
 
state  s2  all  16  proposers  offered  option  A.  In  reply  to  these  proposals,  11  out  of  16 
responders (69%) accepted option A in state s1. As expected the favorable option B was 
always accepted (16/16, 100%) in state s1. In state s2, option A was always accepted 
(16/16, 100%) and option B would have been accepted by 10 out of 16 proposers (63%).
5 
In Non-Transparency all but two out of the 32 proposers offered option A. 15 out of 16 
responders (94%) accepted option A in state s1 and 14 out of 16 (88%) agreed to option B 
in state s2. The favorable option in state s1, i.e., option B, was always accepted. The same 
is true for option A in state s2.  
 
Observation 1: In state s1 proposers significantly more often offered option A in  
Non-Transparency than in Transparency.
6  
                                                 
5 Note that none of the proposers actually offered option B in state s2, but since we employed a reduced 
version of the strategy method responders were asked to provide their responses to both possible offers. 
6 With p=0.017 (Fisher-Test, one-sided). This observation is also backed by OLS and probit regressions 
(see appendix).  13 
 
Responders reacted differently to unfavorable offers in the two treatment variations.  
 
Observation 2: In state s1 responders significantly more often accepted option A 
in Non-Transparency than in Transparency.
7  
 
Thus, our hypotheses concerning both treatments are supported: Proposers who were kept 
ignorant almost always offered option A and responders tended to accept these offers. 
Informed proposers in state s1 were considerably less often able to implement their most 
preferred option, i.e., option A.  
In  the  treatments  Transparency  and  Non-Transparency  it  was  exogenously 
determined  whether  the  proposer  was  informed  about  the  actual  state  or  not,  i.e., 
intentions about remaining ignorant or not did not play a role. Let us now turn to the 
treatments where ignorance was endogenous, i.e., could be chosen by the proposer.     
     
5.2. Results Choice Treatments  
In  contrast  to  our  hypothesis  in  the  treatments  Choice  and  Choice-UR  a 
considerable number of  proposers decided  for  remaining  ignorant. In both  treatments 
76% chose to reveal the state. In Choice-UR 53% of the proposers who tried to reveal the 
actual state were successful in revealing while the others remained ignorant. In Choice-H 
88% of the proposers revealed the state.   
 
Observation 3: In Choice and in Choice-UR a considerable number of proposers 
chose to remain ignorant.  
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of proposers who offered option A in state s1 in 
which the interests of both players were not aligned. The results in state s2 were very 
similar to those in Transparency and Non-Transparency: Proposers almost always offered 
option A and responders almost always accepted this offer (see also the summary table in 
the appendix).     
                                                 
7 With p=0.077 (Fisher-Test, one-sided). This observation is also backed by OLS and probit regressions 
(see appendix).  14 
 
       
Figure 2: Proportions of proposers offering option A in state s1 where the interests of both players are not 
aligned; note that in Non-Transparency, Choice ignorant, Choice-UR ignorant and Choice-H ignorant 
proposers are not aware that they actually are in state s1 
 
In each of the treatments Choice, Choice-UR and Choice-H 3 of the proposers (in Choice 
out  of  35  proposers,  in  Choice-UR  out  of  20  proposers  and  in  Choice-H  out  of  14 
proposers), who (successfully) revealed the actual state to be s1, offered option A.  
 
Observation 4: In all three Choice treatments, a clear majority of proposers who 
revealed the state of nature to be s1, decided to offer option B.  
 
Proposers who actually were in state s1 but decided to remain ignorant in the three Choice 
treatments significantly more often proposed option A in comparison to situations where 
proposers revealed the state s1 (all significant at the 1%-Level, Fisher-Tests, one-sided, 
for  each  respective  Choice  treatment).
8  In  the  Transparency  treatment  proposers 
                                                 
8 See also the OLS and probit regressions in the appendix. Here the  p-values show that compared to 
Transparency, a significantly smaller proportion of revealing proposers offered option A. Proposers who 
remained ignorant significantly more often offered option A.   15 
 
significantly more often (56%) offered option A in state s1 than proposers who revealed in 
the treatments Choice and Choice-UR.
9 
Figure 3 depicts the responders’ rates of accepting option A in state s1. Again, we 
focus on the acceptance of option A in state s1 where the interests of both players are not 
aligned. In state s2 - not shown here - proposers always offered option A which was 
almost always accepted by the responders.   
 
 
Figure 3: Proportions of responders accepting option A in state s1 where the interests of both players are not 
aligned 
 
In  Choice  responders  knew  whether  they  received  an  offer  from  a  revealing 
(Choice revealed) or an ignorant (Choice ignorant) proposer. 14 out of 35 proposers 
(40%) accepted option A offered by a revealing proposer. If this offer came from an 
ignorant proposer it was accepted with a higher frequency, i.e., by 7 out of 12 responders 
(58%).  Hence,  our  hypothesis  that  unfavorable  offers  from  ignorant  proposers  are 
evaluated  equally  badly  than  offers  from  proposers  who  revealed  yields  only  limited 
support. Responders in Choice-UR knew when a proposer successfully revealed the state 
of nature. The acceptance rates were identical to Choice, i.e., in Choice-UR 8 out of 20 
responders (40%) accepted option A offered by a proposer who successfully revealed. If 
proposers  in  Choice-UR  remained  ignorant,  responders  did  not  know  whether  this 
                                                 
9 With p=0.001 comparing Transparency and Choice, p=0.02 comparing Transparency and Choice-UR 
(Fisher-Tests, two-sided). 16 
 
ignorance  was  intended  by  the  proposers  or  whether  the  attempt  to  reveal  was  not 
successful. We find that 21 out of 31 responders (68%) accepted option A offered by 
ignorant proposers, which is well above the corresponding acceptance rate in  Choice 
ignorant.  
 
Observation 5: In Choice in state s1 option A was more often accepted when it 
was offered by an ignorant proposer than by a proposer who revealed the actual 
state. In Choice-UR in state s1 option A was significantly more often accepted 
when it was offered by an ignorant proposer than by a proposer who revealed the 
actual state.
10    
 
As  there  was  uncertainty  about  the  proposers’  intentions  to  remain  ignorant,  our 
hypothesis that unfavorable options offered by ignorant proposers would be more often 
accepted in Choice-UR than in Choice yields some support although the difference is not 
significant. 
In  the  Transparency  treatment  the  acceptance  of  option  A  in  state  s1  was 
significantly higher than in Choice and Choice-UR when proposers revealed state s1.
11 
Explicitly revealing the state  s1 and then offering the unfavorable option (Choice and 
Choice-UR) seemed to be disliked more by the responders than offering the unfavorable 
option after having been automatically informed about the state s1 (Transparency). In 
Choice-H the responder was not informed whether the proposer revealed the state of 
nature or not. In this treatment the acceptance rate for option A in state s1 was between 
those of Choice revealed and Choice ignorant as 8 out of 16 responders (50%) accepted 
this  offer.  The  same  is  true  when  comparing  the  acceptance  rates  of  Choice-H  and 
Choice-UR.   
 
                                                 
10 Not significant in  Choice with p=0.326 (Fisher-Test,  two-sided) and significant in  Choice-UR with 
p=0.082 (Fisher-Test, two-sided).  
11  With p=0.048 (Fisher-Test, one-sided, pooled data from Choice and Choice-UR). See also the OLS and 
probit  regressions  in  the  appendix.  The p-values  show  that  compared  to  Transparency,  a  significantly 
smaller share of responders accepted option A offered by proposers who revealed state s1.    17 
 
5.4. Hypothetical Decisions and Beliefs in Choice  
We asked non-revealing proposers in Choice what they would hypothetically have 
done in case they had revealed the state of nature. 12 out of 23 proposers (52%) would 
have offered option A in state s1. But only 3 out of 35 proposers (9%) who actually 
revealed state s1 offered option A. This difference between proposers who revealed and 
those who did not is significant (p=0.0002, Fisher-Test, one-sided). A reason might be 
that proposers who revealed the state of nature were of a more fair-minded type than 
proposers who chose ignorance.  
We also asked proposers who revealed the state of nature whether they believed 
that option A in state s1 offered by a revealing proposer would have been accepted or not..  
40 out of 72 proposers (56%) thought that such an offer would have been accepted. The 
same proposers were also asked about their beliefs concerning the acceptance of option A 
in state s1 in case a proposer had chosen ignorance. Here only 26 out of 72 revealing 
proposers (36%) believed that this offer would have been accepted. The picture changes 
when posing the same questions to proposers who did not reveal: 10 out of 23 proposers 
(43%) believed that option A in state s1 would have been accepted if the proposer had 
revealed the state of nature. Without revelation 19 out of 23 (82%) ignorant proposers 
thought that this offer would have been accepted, which is a significant difference in 
comparison  to  revealing  proposers  (p=0.004,  McNemar-Test,  two-sided).  Thus,  the 
beliefs  of  revealing  and  non-revealing  proposers  seemed  to  reflect  their  differing 
perceptions of the effectiveness of ignorance in terms of a potential strategic advantage.
12  
Taking a closer look at the responders’ beliefs and hypothetical decisions in the 
Choice treatment sheds some light on the role of the proposers’ intentions. Only 14 out of 
the 35 responders (40%) actually accepted option A in state s1 offered by a proposer who 
                                                 
12 Asking participants to briefly explain the motivation of their decisions generated interesting insights. A 
proposer  who  decided  to  reveal  the  state,  for  example,  wrote  (translated  from  German):  “I  revealed 
because I wanted to offer option B in case of state s1. If I really wanted to offer option A in this state, I 
would not have revealed to positively influence the responder to accept option A.” Another proposer who 
did not reveal the state of nature commented: “I did not reveal to have an excuse for offering option A in 
state s1. In my opinion the responder then does not think that I am intentionally mean.” A responder who 
received an offer from a proposer who revealed wrote: “I accepted option B in state s1 as it is the fair 
solution for both players. But I did not accept option A because I don’t want to accept €6 for him and only 
€1 for me. I decided this way because I knew that the proposer revealed the state. In case the proposer 
would not have revealed I would have accepted all offers because then chance would have decided and the 
proposer would not have known what state actually occurred.”                 18 
 
revealed. But 21 out of these 35 responders (60%) would have hypothetically accepted 
this offer if the proposer had remained ignorant (p=0.016, McNemar-Test, two-sided).
13 
Moreover, 7 out of 12 responders (58%) accepted option A in state s1 when it was offered 
by an ignorant proposer. Only 4 out of these 12 responders (33%), however, would have 
accepted this offer if it had been made by a proposer who revealed the state s1.
14   
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The  results  from  the  Transparency  and  Non-Transparency  treatments  provide 
support for Schelling’s conjecture: Ignorance can indeed be an advantage for proposers. 
Almost  all  incompletely  informed  proposers  in  Non-Transparency  implement  their 
maximum payoff, i.e., €6. Responders seem to acknowledge that their opponents do not 
know the responders’ payoff structure. The high rate of acceptance may be due to the 
responders’ tendency to attribute unfavorable offers to the chance-based source of the 
randomly occurring state of nature. By doing so the selfish intention of the proposer 
might be diluted. 
In the three Choice treatments there are at least two reasons for a proposer to 
remain ignorant. The first is that a proposer wants to remain ignorant in front of herself, 
i.e., she does not want to know what a respective offer exactly means for a responder. A 
proposer who wants to offer option A may easier feel morally consistent when being 
ignorant compared to knowing the state as the random draw could be blamed for an 
outcome that is potentially unfavorable for the responder (see also Dana et al., 2007). 
However, our observations in the treatment Choice-H indicate that this explanation might 
not be the only one: In this treatment only very few proposers remain ignorant (in front of 
themselves) when responders are not informed about the proposer’s decision whether to 
reveal  or  not.  An  additional  reason  for  remaining  ignorant  might  be  that  a  proposer 
strategically uses ignorance. Such a proposer may believe that ignorance increases the 
                                                 
13  Asking  this  question  to  all  responders  who  received  an  offer  from  a  revealing  proposer  regardless 
whether they were in state s1 or state s2 showed that 38 out of 72 responders (53%) would have accepted 
option A in state s1from an ignorant proposer.  
14  Asking this question to all responders who received an offer from an ignorant proposer regardless 
whether they were in state  s1 or state s2 showed that only 8 out of 23 responders (35%) would have 
accepted option A from a proposer who revealed state s1.   
 19 
 
responder’s  inclination  to  accept  even  unfavorable  offers.  This  second  explanation  is 
supported by the proposers’ beliefs and also by answers to our open question: Ignorant 
proposers think that option A in state s1 would be less frequently accepted if they had 
revealed.  
Responders  seem  to  differentiate  between  offers  coming  from  informed  or 
ignorant proposers. One might think that the intention to propose an unfavorable offer is 
evaluated as equally badly by a responder regardless whether a proposer informed herself 
or deliberately remained ignorant. Since revealing the state is costless, it could even be 
argued that remaining intentionally ignorant is a more ruthless behavior of the proposer. 
The acceptance rates and the hypothetical decisions, however, show that responders are 
inclined to accept unfavorable offers from intentionally ignorant proposers more often 
than from proposers who revealed the state. Moreover, unfavorable offers from revealing 
proposers  in  each  of  the  Choice  treatments  are  more  often  rejected  than  in  the 
Transparency treatment. Responders seem to perceive unfavorable offers by proposers 
who  deliberately  revealed  state  s1  (in  the  Choice  treatments)  as  worse  intended  than 
unfavorable offers by proposers who are unintentionally informed about the state s1 (in 
the Transparency treatment).  
A  crucial  question  is  whether  it  pays  for  the  proposer  to  be  (strategically) 
ignorant. When the proposers are kept ignorant in the Non-Transparency treatment they 
earn  significantly  more  than  in  the  Transparency  treatment  independently  of  the 
occurring state (p=0.016, Mann-Whitney-U-Test, two-sided). In Transparency proposers 
earn €5.19 on average compared to €5.69 in Non-Transparency.  In the Choice treatment 
there is no significant difference between payoffs achieved from informed and ignorant 
proposers,  respectively  (p=0.158,  Mann-Whitney-U-Test,  two-sided).  However,  with 
ambiguity  about  the  proposer’s  intentions  in  Choice-UR  ignorant  proposers  earn 
significantly more than proposers who successfully reveal state s1 or state s2 (p=0.045, 
Mann-Whitney-U-Test,  two-sided).  Remaining  strategically  ignorant  in  this  treatment 
pays off as proposers who reveal earn €4.83 on average. Ignorant proposers on average 
make €5.20.  
In  this  study  we  find  indications  that  ignorance  about  an  opponent’s  payoff 
structure might be an advantage in bargaining. We design a take-it-of-leave-it bargaining 20 
 
experiment and observe that both unintended and strategic ignorance can be a source of 
bargaining strength. Proposers who are kept ignorant about the opponents’ actual payoffs 
are  almost  always  able  to  implement  their  most  preferred  option.  Proposers  who 
intentionally choose to remain ignorant about their opponents’ bargaining position are 
more  frequently  able  to  realize  their  payoff-maximizing  bargaining  solution  than 
proposers  who  gather  information.  A  remarkable  proportion  of  responders  receiving 
unfavorable  offers  do  not  punish  ignorant  proposers  through  rejection.  Although 
proposers can costlessly acquire information about payoff consequences, responders do 
not  resent  the  proposers’  ignorance.  Hence,  Schelling’s  conjecture  (1960)  that 
informational weakness can be strength is supported but also extended: Ignorance can 
even be used strategically if the opponent is aware of the ignorance.  
In the light of our results, research on the strategic use of ignorance in bargaining 
appears to be undervalued so far. Naturally our experiment uses a specific bargaining 
format and a specific payoff structure. Further research is needed to verify whether our 
findings extend to bargaining formats that do not employ anonymous take-it-or-leave-it 
offers, for example, like sequential offer bargaining or face-to-face settings. It also needs 
to be investigated how different payoff constellations in the bargaining game affect the 
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Table A1: Proposers’ offers and receivers’ acceptance rates; note that proposers in the treatment Non-Transparency and proposers who did not reveal in the 
Choice treatments are not aware of the actual state  
 
                             
Treatment      Transparent / Revealed  Non-Transparent / Not-Revealed 
      State s1  State s2  State s1  State s2 
   Proposals / Acceptances Rates   Option A  Option B  Option A  Option B  Option A  Option B  Option A  Option B 
Transparency                
(n=64) 
Proposer  9/16 (56%)  7/16 (44%)  16/16 (100%)  0/16 (0%)  -  -  -  - 
Responder  11/16 (69%)  16/16 (100%)  16/16 (100%)  10/16 (63%)  -  -  -  - 
Non-Transparency                
(n=64) 
Proposer  -  -  -  -  15/16 (94%)  1/16 (6%)  15/16 (94%)  1/16 (6%) 
Responder  -  -  -  -  15/16 (94%)  16/16 (100%)  16/16 (100%)  14/16 (88%) 
Choice                                  
(n=190) 
Proposer  3/35 (9%)  32/35 (91%)  37/37 (100%)  0/37 (0%)  12/12 (100%)  0/12 (0%)  11/11 (100%)   0/11 (0%) 
Responder  14/35 (40%)  35/35 (100%)  37/37 (100%)  18/37 (49%)  7/12 (58%)  12/12 (100%)  11/11 (100%)  6/11 (55%) 
Choice-UR                           
(n=210) 
Proposer (intentionally ignorant) 
3/20 (15%)  17/20 (85%)  22/22 (100%)  0/22 (0%) 
12/13 (92%)  1/13 (8%)  12/12 (100%)  0/12 (0%) 
Proposer (unintentionally ignorant)  16/18 (89%)  2/18 (11%)  19/20 (95%)  1/20 (5%) 
   Responder  8/20 (40%)  20/20 (100%)  21 /22 (95%)  14/22 (63%)  21/31 (68%)  31/31 (100%)  31/32 (97%)  24/32 (75%) 
Choice-H                     
(n=64) 
Proposer  3/14 (21%)  11/14 (79%)  14/14 (100%)  0/14 (0%)  2/2 (100%)  0/2 (0%)  2/2 (100%)  0/2 (0%) 
Responder  -  -  -  -  8/16 (50%)  16/16 (100%)  16 /16 (100%)  12/16 (75%) 27 
 
  (1) OLS  (2) Probit  (3) OLS  (4) Probit 
  offer_A  offer_A  accept_A  accept_A 
         
Non-Transparency  0.375***  0.470***  0.249  0.320** 
  (0.118)  (0.134)  (0.155)  (0.126) 
Choice_r  -0.477***  -0.510***  -0.288**  -0.301** 
  (0.101)  (0.104)  (0.129)  (0.134) 
Choice_nr  0.437***  dropped  -0.105  -0.123 
  (0.127)  (0.169)  (0.184) 
Choice-UR_r  -0.413***  -0.401***  -0.289**  -0.310** 
  (0.112)  (0.114)  (0.116)  (0.123) 
Choice-UR_r_ns  0.326***  0.389***     
  (0.115)  (0.148)     
Choice-UR_nr  0.361***  0.439***  0.157  0.164 
  (0.124)  (0.146)  (0.115)  (0.112) 
Choice-H_r  -0.348***  -0.330**     
  (0.122)  (0.134)     
Choice-H_nr  0.437*  dropped     
  (0.250)     
Choice-H      -0.188  -0.206 
      (0.155)  (0.165) 
Constant  0.563***    0.688***   
  (0.0833)    (0.101)   
         
Observations  146  132  146  146 
R-squared  0.583    0.141   
pseudo R-squared    0.446    0.117 
 
Table A2: OLS and probit regressions on decisions in state s1. Model (1) and (2) explain the effects of the 
different treatment situations on the proposer’s decision to offer option A (offer_A). Model (3) and (4) 
explain  the  effect  of  the  different  treatment  situations  on  the  responder’s  decision  to  accept  option  A 
(accept_A).  Reference  category  is  the  Transparency  treatment.  Independent  variables  are  dummies  for 
different treatment situations. Choice_r stands for the Choice treatment in which a proposer revealed state 
s1 and Choice_nr stands for a situation in which a proposer did not reveal the state. The same applies for 
the treatments Choice-UR and Choice-H. Choice-UR_r_ns stands for a situation, in which a proposer tried 
to reveal but was not successful, i.e., she remained uninformed about the state. Choice-H means a situation 
where a responder does not know if a proposer revealed the state or not. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Levels of significance are indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 











Instructions (translated from German)  
{[Transparency, Non-Transparency, Choice, Choice-UR, Choice-H] 
Instructions  
Welcome  and  thank  for  your  participation  in  today’s  experiment.  Please  read  these 
instructions carefully. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to raise your hand, we 
will help you personally.  
In this experiment you can earn money. The amount of money you will earn depends on 
both, your own decisions and the decisions taken by another participant. At the end of the 
experiment you will receive your payoff in cash. Your payoff is composed out of the 
experiment’s payoff and a show-up fee of €2.50. You will receive the participation show-
up fee independently from the payoffs you gain during the experiment.  
From now on, we kindly asked you stop all communication. Please make sure that your 
cell phone is switched off. A violation against these rules may lead to the exclusion from 
this and other experiments.  
 
The Basic Decision Situation 
In the decision situation there are two types of participants, participant X and participant 
Y, and two possible cases, case 1 and case 2. The payoff-tables for both participants are 




Selection by     
participant X:                       
       
      
           Case 1                                          Case 2 
 
One  of  the  two  cases  will  randomly  appear.  Case  1  and  case  2  occur  with  equal 
probability. Within each case, two Options exist, Option A and Option B. Participant X 
chooses  one  of  the  two  Options.  With  each  respective  Option,  different  payoffs  for 
participant X and participant Y are associated. Independently from the occurring case, 
Option A leads to a payoff of €6 and Option B to €4 for participant X. For participant Y 
different payoffs are associated with the different Options in the different cases. In case 
of case 1, Option A would lead to a payoff of €1 and Option B to a payoff of €5. In the 
event of case 2, Option A would lead to a payoff of €5 and Option B to a payoff of €1. 
Participant  Y  is  able  to  accept  or  to  reject  the  Option  proposed  by  participant  X.  If 
participant Y accepts the Option chosen by participant X, both participants receive the 
respective payoffs. If participants Y rejects the  Option chosen by participant X, both 




A  X:6€     
Y:1€  
Option 
B  X:4€  
Y:5€  
Option 
A  X:6€  
Y:5€  
Option 
B  X:4€  
Y:1€  29 
 
The Decision Situation in Detail 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be informed via the computer screen which 
of  the  two possible  roles  –  either  participant X  or  participant  Y  –  will be  randomly 
assigned to you. At the same time and again randomly you will be assigned to another 
participant you will interact with. This assignment is completely anonymous. In each 
composed pair, one participant has the role of participant X and the other has the role of 
participant Y. The interaction within each pair only occurs through the computers. After 
you are informed about your role, you can continue by pressing an OK-Button.}   
 
{[Transparency] Participant X takes the first decision. He is informed which of the two 
possible cases – case 1 or case 2 – have occurred. Thus, he sees one of the two following 
payoff-tables:} 
 
{[Choice, Choice-UR, Choice-H] Participant X takes the first decisions. At the beginning 
he sees the following buttons. He chooses between the two buttons by pressing one of 
them:  





Participant X has two possibilities: He can {[Choice-UR: try to]} reveal participant Y’s 
possible payoffs or he cannot reveal, respectively. 
If participant X decides for pressing the button ―Reveal participant Y’s payoff‖ he sees 






Selection by     
participant X:                       
       
      
        Case 1                                       Case 2 
 
Specifically, through pressing the button ―Reveal participant Y’s payoff‖, participant X 
is informed {[Choice-UR: with a probability of 50%]} which of the two possible cases – 
case 1 or case 2 – has occurred. {[Choice-UR: With a probability of 50% participant X 
does  not  learn  which  case  has  occured  although  he  pressed  the  Button  ―Reveal 
participant Y’s payoff”. In this case the attempt to reveal participant Y’s payoff was not 
successful and participant X only sees the following table: 
Option 
A  X:6€     
Y:1€  
Option 
B  X:4€  
Y:5€  
Option 
A  X:6€  
Y:5€  
Option 




Do not reveal 





                   
Selection by 
        
participant X:                                                                                              
      
                                                         
 
Case 1 or case 2 
 
Here participant X does not know which of the two possible cases has occurred. Instead 
of participant Y’s possible payoffs only a ―?‖ is visible.]}  
{[Transparency,  Choice,  Choice-UR,  Choice-H]  Now,  participant  X  chooses  between 
Option A and Option B. Note that the payoffs for participant X associated with the two 
cases are identical with respect to the Options. This means participant X always receives 
€6 for Option A and €4 for Option B provided participant Y accepts the chosen Option. 
For participant Y the payoffs in both cases are differently.}  
 
{[Non-Transparency] Participant X takes the first decision. He is not informed which of 
the two possible cases – case 1 or case 2 – have occurred. Thus, he sees the two following 
payoff-table:]} 
 
{[Choice, Choice-UR, Choice-H] If participant X decides for pressing the button ―Do not 
reveal participant Y’s payoff‖ he sees the following payoff-table:    
   
 
  
                   
Selection by 
        
participant X:                                                                                              
      
                                                         
 
Case 1 or case 2 
 
 
Participant  X  then  decides  not  to  know  the  possible  payoffs  for  participant  Y.}  
{[Non-Transparency, Choice, Choice-UR, Choice-H] Specifically he is not informed if 
case 1 or case 2 occurred. Instead of participant Y’s possible payoffs only a ―?‖ is visible. 
But participant X knows that he receives a payoff of €6 for Option A and a payoff of €4 
for Option B if participant Y accepts his decision. Participant X then chooses between 
Option A and Option B.} 
 
Option 
A  X:6€     
Y:?€  
Option 
B  X:4€  
Y:?€  
Option 
A  X:6€     
Y:?€  
Option 
B  X:4€  
Y:?€  31 
 
 
{[Transparency, Non-Transparency, Choice, Choice-UR, Choice-H] Participant Y will 
be informed which of the cases – case 1 or case 2 – have occurred.} [{Choice] At the 
same  time  he  is {[Choice-H] not}  informed  if participant X revealed participant Y’s 
possible  payoffs  or  if  he  covered  it.  Thus,  he  will  be  {[Choice-H]  not}  informed  if 
participant X knew the possible payoffs for participant Y associated with the  Option 
chosen. {[Choice-UR] If participant X was uninformed about participant Y’s payoff this 
can be due to two reasons: either participant was not successful revealing participant Y’s 
possible payoffs or participant X decided not to reveal participant Y’s possible payoffs. If 
participant X was uninformed participant Y will not be informed due to which reason 
participant X became uninformed.} {[Transparency, Non-Transparency, Choice, Choice-
UR, Choice-H] Participant Y now decides for both possible Options of participant X – so 
for Option A and Option B – if he accepts or rejects participant X’s choice. Depending on 
the Option actually chosen by participant X, payoffs for both participants are determined. 
If participant Y accepts the Option chosen by participant X, both participants receive 
their  respective  payoffs.  If  participant  Y  rejects  the  Option  chosen,  both  participants 
receive zero payoffs.} 
 
{}  =  Indicate  the  phrase  that  is  exclusively  employed  in  the  respective  treatment, 



















Questions of Comprehension  
Please answer the following questions. If you have a question, raise your hand, we will help 
personally.  
 
For the following questions, assume that case 1 has occurred: 
What is the payoff for participant X and participant Y if participant X chooses Option A and 
participant Y accepts this choice?              Participant  X              Participant Y 
What is the payoff for participant X and participant Y if participant X chooses Option A and 
participant Y rejects this choice?              Participant  X              Participant Y 
What is the payoff for participant X and participant Y if participant X chooses Option B and 
participant Y accepts this choice?              Participant  X              Participant Y 
What is the payoff for participant X or participant Y if participant X chooses Option B and 
participant Y rejects this choice?              Participant  X              Participant Y 
 
For the following questions, assume that case 2 has occurred: 
What is the payoff for participant X and participant Y if participant X chooses Option A and 
participant Y accepts this choice?               Participant  X              Participant Y 
What is the payoff for participant X and participant Y if participant X chooses Option A and 
participant Y rejects this choice?               Participant  X              Participant Y 
What is the payoff for participant X and participant Y if participant X chooses Option B and 
participant Y accepts this choice?              Participant  X              Participant Y 
What is the payoff for participant X and participant Y if participant X chooses Option B and 
participant Y rejects this choice?              Participant  X              Participant Y 
 
Please specify for the following statements if they are right or wrong:   
Participant X always receives €6 for Option A and €4 for Option B if participant Y accepts the 
Option chosen by participant X!                                                                             Right        Wrong  
Participant Y always receives €1 for Option A and €5 for Option B if he accepts the Option 
chosen by participant X!                           Right        Wrong 
The probability that case 1 or case 2 occurs is exactly the same!                           Right        Wrong  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 